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Previous studies have shown that emotional stimuli can be processed through the
amygdala without conscious awareness. The amygdala is also involved in processing
animate and social information. However, it is unclear whether different categories of
pictures (e.g., animals, objects) elicit different activity in the amygdale and other regions
without conscious awareness. The objective of this study was to explore whether
the factors of category, emotion and picture context modulate brain activation for
unconscious processing. Pictures denoting different nonhuman animals and objects
in negative and neutral emotional valences were presented using a sandwich-masking
paradigm. Half of them were presented with human-related information in the contexts,
and half were not. Our results showed significant interaction among category, emotion
and context in the amygdala and subcortical regions. Specifically, negative animals
elicited stronger activation in these regions than negative objects, especially with
human contexts. In addition, there were different correlation patterns between the
amygdala and cortical regions according to whether they included human context.
There were limited activations in cortical category-related networks. These results
suggest that the amygdala and subcortical regions dominantly process negative
animals, and contextual information modulates their activities, making threatening stimuli
that are most relevant to human survival preferentially processed without conscious
awareness.
Keywords: category, amygdala, awareness, emotion, context
INTRODUCTION
Many studies have shown that the amygdala plays an important role in emotional processing
under both conscious and unconscious conditions (for reviews, see Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010;
Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010). When stimuli are presented without conscious awareness,
the amygdala shows enhanced activation for negative relative to neutral stimuli in healthy
participants (e.g., Morris et al., 1998; Whalen et al., 1998; Jiang and He, 2006; Williams et al.,
2006). Patients with amygdala lesions demonstrate comparable physiological responses for
masked emotional pictures (30 ms) in comparison to neutral pictures (e.g., Glascher and
Adolphs, 2003). In addition, the amygdala activation is correlated with that in subcortical regions,
including the pulvinar and anterior nucleus of the thalamus (Morris et al., 1999; Williams
et al., 2006). These results suggest that unconscious response to emotional, especially negative,
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stimuli depends on the amygdala and subcortical regions
(Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010).
In addition to being involved in emotional processing,
the amygdala is also more responsive to animate relative to
inanimate stimuli. The preparedness model (Seligman, 1970;
Ohman and Mineka, 2001) emphasizes the role of the stimulus
category in emotional processing. It is proposed that fear is
more readily learned and resistant to extinction for threatening
stimuli that are related to our evolutionary ancestors (e.g., the
phylogenetic fear of snakes or spiders) than for those that
have only recently emerged in our cultural history (e.g., the
ontogenetic fear of guns or motorcycles; for reviews, see Ohman
and Mineka, 2001; Mineka and Ohman, 2002). Studies have
found that the amygdala responds more strongly to animate
stimuli than inanimate stimuli in neural recording of patients
(e.g., Mormann et al., 2011; Rutishauser et al., 2011) and in
fMRI studies (e.g., Yang et al., 2012a; Coker-Appiah et al.,
2013).
However, it remains unclear whether different categories of
negative stimuli modulate activation in the amygdala and other
brain regions for unconscious processing. Animate categories of
stimuli may be more likely to induce fear. For example, negative
animal pictures showed stronger skin conductance responses
(SCR) than objects under the unconscious condition (Tan et al.,
2013). The preparedness theory hypothesized that, compared
to the ontogenetic category (e.g., guns), the phylogenetic
category (e.g., snakes) could be processed without conscious
awareness and this processing would be amygdala dependent
(Ohman and Mineka, 2001; Mineka and Ohman, 2002). So far,
few neuroimaging studies have directly manipulated stimulus
category during unconscious emotional processing. For example,
when masked pictures of snakes and spiders were compared
with those of mushrooms (Carlsson et al., 2004), the amygdala
was strongly activated. However, it is noteworthy that snakes
and mushrooms differ in both valence and category, making
it difficult to interpret the results as emotional or category
effect.
The amygdala is also activated by stimuli depicting social
information (Adolphs, 2010; Frith and Frith, 2012) when
stimulus information appear in a background involving human-
related information (Norris et al., 2004), or when stimuli can
be interpreted as social interaction or human-related (Wheatley
et al., 2007; Sakaki et al., 2012). Category and social contexts
interact in emotional processing, because negative animal and
object pictures elicit comparable activation in the amygdala when
a human or human body is included as contextual information
(Cao et al., 2014). There is some evidence suggesting that social
cues could be processed unconsciously (Adolphs, 2010; Frith
and Frith, 2012). For example, during unconscious processing,
faces turned towards the viewer broke through suppression
faster than faces that were turned away (Gobbini et al., 2013),
whereas nonsocial cues interfered with the target detection
and led to higher subjective threshold (Ruderman and Lamy,
2012). Crouzet et al. (2012) found that contextual information
tended to bias responses to animate objects (but not vehicular
responses) as early as 160 ms after stimulus onset. Despite this,
opposite evidence existed as well (e.g., Tan et al., 2013), which
showed that animal pictures elicited stronger SCR than objects
under the unconscious condition, irrespective of contextual
information. Therefore, the extent to which social contexts
modulate amygdala activation during unconscious processing is
unclear.
The current study addressed these questions by presenting
subjects with pictures of animals and objects in negative
and neutral valences during functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI). To ensure that subjects processed the pictures
without conscious awareness, a sandwich-masking paradigm
was adopted and post hoc awareness detection was performed.
To dissociate the effects of emotion and category, valence and
arousal levels were matched in animal and object categories.
To examine the effect of context on brain activity, picture
contexts including human or nonhuman information were
manipulated. Main effects of the emotion, category and
context and their interactions were analyzed. In addition
to the voxel-wise approach, we also applied a connectivity
analysis in order to clarify the patterns of inter-area functional
correlation in different experimental conditions (e.g., Jiang
and He, 2006; Williams et al., 2006). The correlation
analysis could further identify whether animals and objects
elicited different brain connectivity during unconscious
processing of emotionally laden animals and objects. We
hypothesized that negative pictures would elicit stronger
amygdala responses than neutral pictures. In addition, based
on the preparedness theory (Ohman and Mineka, 2001) and
previous behavioral and psychophysiological findings (Ohman
and Soares, 1993; Tan et al., 2013), we hypothesized that
animal images would lead to stronger amygdala responses
than pictures of objects. Finally, we predicted that the
subcortical and cortical regions would show differential
activity for animal relative to object pictures, especially for
negative pictures (Isbell, 2006; Tamietto and de Gelder,
2010).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Sixty-two healthy, right-handed subjects (28 males) participated
in the study, with a mean age of 22.54 years (standard deviation
(SD): 2.75). Of these subjects, 21 participated in emotional
rating (10 males), 18 in familiarity rating (7 males), and the
other 23 in the fMRI experiment (11 males). Among the 23
subjects who participated in the fMRI experiment, four were
excluded from fMRI analysis due to large head motion (two
subjects) and high awareness level (two subjects, see details
in the ‘‘Results’’ Section). All subjects were native Chinese
speakers, and gave written informed consent in accordance
with the procedures and protocols approved by the Institutional
Review Board of the Department of Psychology, Peking
University.
Stimuli
Three within-subject factors were considered in the study with a
2× 2× 2 structure: context (with [H] or without human context
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FIGURE 1 | Stimulus example of the experiment.
[NH]), emotion (negative, neutral) and category (nonhuman
animals, objects; Figure 1). The combinations of the three
factors made up eight experimental conditions (i.e., animals
and objects in H-negative, H-neutral, NH-negative, NH-neutral
conditions). The stimuli in the fMRI experiment consisted of
240 colorful, nameable experimental pictures (30 per condition)
with a resolution of 640 × 480 pixels. All target images in the
stimuli (i.e., the item defining the category of the stimulus, e.g., a
snake) were depicted with or without human context (or human
parts, e.g., an object held in a hand). In the pictures, human
contexts interacted with the animal/object. In some negative
pictures, the animal or the object had the action/potential to
harm a human (e.g., a bear running at a human). In other
negative pictures, human context handled the animal or the
object (e.g., a snake is put on the hand). Low-level visual
features (e.g., luminance, contrast, saturation of each color
channel), picture size, position of focal object and context (i.e.,
central/peripheral, left/right) and contextual information (e.g.,
human face, hands) were also matched across categories (Yang
et al., 2012b). Control stimuli were scrambled pictures, which
were consisted of phase-scrambled images of each picture that
preserved the color and the spatial frequency of the original
image.
Analyses of the rating data by 21 subjects confirmed that
categories of animals and objects did not significantly differ
on valence (1 = very unpleasant to 9 = very pleasant) and
arousal (1 = very calming to 9 = very arousing; Table 1).
By design, negative pictures were more negative and more
arousing than neutral pictures, F(1,20) = 230.73, p < 0.001,
and F(1,20) = 99.26, p < 0.001. Pictures with human contexts
were more negative and more arousing than those without,
F(1,20) = 58.27, p < 0.001, and F(1,20) = 78.62, p < 0.001.
Rating of animal and object pictures did not significantly
differ for valence, F(1,20) = 0.09, p = 0.76, nor for arousal,
F(1,20) = 3.44, p = 0.08. The interactions related to category
were not significant, ps > 0.05 (i.e., interaction between
category and emotion, category and context, and three-way
interaction). Particularly, there was no significant difference
between animals and objects in each condition comparison
(i.e., H-negative, H-neutral, NH-negative, NH-neutral) for both
valence (p’s > 0.30) and arousal (p’s > 0.10) ratings. Thus,
affective levels would not confound the activation related to
category.
The familiarity was also matched between categories.
Subjects evaluated how often they saw or thought of the
focal object (i.e., an animal or object) in their daily life
(1 = least familiar; 7 = most familiar). The results showed that
category effect was not significant, F(1,17) = 1.66, p = 0.22.
Neutral pictures were more familiar than negative pictures,
F(1,17) = 17.65, p = 0.001, and pictures without human
contexts were more familiar than those with human contexts,
F(1,17) = 12.09, p = 0.003. There were no significant category-
related effects, p’s > 0.20, and the familiarity rating scores were
comparable between animals and objects in each condition,
p’s > 0.10. Thus, familiarity rating was not a confounding
factor that might influence the category effect in the fMRI
analysis.
fMRI Procedure
Pictures were clustered into blocks by context, emotion and
category, with each of the 2× 2× 2 conditions having two blocks.
In each block, there were 20 images (15 different stimulus
pictures and five squares). For each trial, a cross ‘‘+’’ (900 ms),
a forward mask (133 ms), a stimulus picture (33 ms, refresh
rate of the Samsung monitor was set at 60 Hz), and a backward
mask (133 ms) were presented sequentially (Figure 2A). An
identical masking picture served as the forward and backward
mask in each trial. Following the backward mask, another cross
‘‘+’’ appeared. A black-and-white square was randomly presented
in five trials within a block after the backward mask, and its
time was not counted into the trial timeline (Figure 2). The
participants were asked to press a button within 1200 ms when
they saw the square. In other words, they had to detect the
TABLE 1 | Rating results.
Human context Nonhuman context
Negative Neutral Negative Neutral
Animal Object Animal Object Animal Object Animal Object
Valence Mean 3.08 2.95 4.84 4.75 3.65 3.82 5.10 4.94
SD 0.79 0.53 1.02 0.41 1.01 0.79 1.19 0.37
Arousal Mean 6.61 6.43 4.51 4.22 5.89 5.56 4.02 3.82
SD 1.20 1.35 1.24 1.39 1.19 1.18 1.31 1.48
Familiarity Mean 3.43 3.71 4.15 4.39 3.59 3.72 4.29 4.55
SD 1.41 1.33 1.51 0.74 1.39 1.29 1.54 0.75
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FIGURE 2 | Procedure of fMRI scanning and follow-up awareness assessment. For each fMRI trial (A), a cross (900 ms), a forward mask (133 ms), a stimulus
picture (33 ms), and a backward mask (133 ms) were presented sequentially. During the awareness assessment (B), the sandwich-masked picture was presented
and subjects were asked to judge whether the content of the masked picture was a nonhuman animal or an object, and whether the concept depicted by the picture
could be placed in a shoe box based on its actual size.
black-and-white square if they saw it after the masks. Each trial
lasted for 1200 ms, and each block for 24 s. The 16 picture
blocks and 16 scrambled blocks were pseudo-randomly assigned
to four runs, with the picture conditions and backgrounds
balanced across runs. In addition, the picture and scrambled
blocks were interleaved in each run. Because four additional
TRs (two before the first block and two after the last block)
were inserted for each run, each run lasted for 240 s and the
entire experiment lasted for about 16 min. The orders of the
blocks and runs were counterbalanced across subjects. Subjects
were also asked to fill in state and trait questionnaire of the
State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), once before and once after
the scanning.
Post hoc Awareness Assessment
The awareness levels of the participants were tested within
1 week after the fMRI scanning using semantic judgment
tasks (Figure 2B). The same stimuli and sandwich-masking
manipulations were employed as those in the fMRI procedure,
but the stimuli were presented in different pseudo-random
orders (for blocks and runs) and a Iiyama monitor was used
(refresh rate = 60 Hz). Participants were required to make two
choices after each masked presentation: whether the content
of the masked picture was a nonhuman animal or object, and
whether the concept depicted by the picture could be placed in
a shoe box based on its actual size. Each choice was followed
by a confidence rating associated with the response on a 6-point
scale.
MRI Acquisition
MRI data were collected on a Siemens Trio 3T scanner
(Magnetom Trio) with functional and then anatomical data
acquired respectively using a gradient echo, echo-planar imaging
(EPI) and a high-resolutionMP-RAGE sequence (repetition time
(TR) = 7.6 ms, flip angle = 6◦, field of view (FOV) = 22 cm,
matrix = 256 × 256, resolution = 1 × 1 × 1.2 mm3). The
parameters for the EPI sequence were TR = 3 s, echo time
(TE) = 40 ms, flip angle = 90◦, gap = 1 mm, FOV = 24 cm,
matrix = 96× 96, slice = 34 and resolution = 2.5× 2.5× 4 mm3.
fMRI Data Analysis
AFNI was used for pre-processing imaging data and statistical
analysis (http://afni.nimh.nih.gov. Cox, 1996). The EPI volumes
were registered, smoothed with an RMS width of 3 mm, and
scaled to a voxel-wise mean of 100. Multiple regression analysis
was used to estimate the response to each condition compared
with the scrambled baseline. The model included eight regressors
of interest, each of which was created by convolving a gamma
variate with the stimulus timing under each condition, six
regressors of no interest (motion parameters), and 2nd order
polynomials (slow drift). Anatomical images and the volumes
of effect estimates from the regression analysis were then
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warped into the standard stereotaxic space of the Talairach and
Tournoux (1988) atlas.
For group analysis, a voxel-wise analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was performed with context, emotion and category
as three within-subjects factors (voxel-wise p < 0.02, two-
tailed). The reported statistics were all corrected by multiple
comparisons at a cluster-level P-value of 0.05 in cortical
regions (volume = 544 mm3) and the amygdala (small volume
correction, volume = 131 mm3). The amygdala of each
subject was manually drawn and averaged as the anatomical
mask to confine the activation located within the amygdala.
To further identify whether animals and objects elicited
different brain connectivity during unconscious processing, the
psychophysiological interaction analyses (PPI, Friston et al.,
1997; Gitelman et al., 2003) were performed in which the
two seed regions were created as a 5 mm-diameter sphere
centered on the peak voxel within the left and right amygdala,
and the average time series from each seed was extracted
from the dataset with baseline, slow drift and head motion
removed. The PPI inference at the group level was made
through a one-sample t-test (p < 0.05, corrected, two-
tailed).
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
During scanning, subjects were highly accurate when performing
the detection task. However, accuracy and reaction time did
not show any significant effect in category, emotion, or their
interaction (all F’s < 1.0, p’s > 0.20). Subjects had comparable
STAI state before (32.1± 7.5) and after (32.3± 8.4) the scanning
(p > 0.80), and their trait anxiety scores were within the normal
range (37.4± 6.5).
For the awareness assessment, the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) scores were converted from the
participants’ responses and confidence ratings, and the areas
under the ROC curves (A′) were computed for each participant
and subsequently entered into SPSS for analysis, in which the
subjects were considered as being unaware when their detection
task performance was at the chance level (i.e., the A′ values
were not significantly different from the chance level of 0.5) in
category and size judgments.
The results showed that in the category judgment task,
the A′ values for two subjects were higher than the chance
level (area = 0.57 and 0.59, p’s < 0.05), so their data were
excluded from further analysis. The A′ scores for all remaining
subjects were not significantly larger than the chance level (0.5;
area = 0.48 ± 0.06; t(18) = −2.11; p < 0.05). Subjects also
performed at chance level in judging whether the picture was
larger than a shoebox (area = 0.50 ± 0.04; t(18) = 0.93, p = 0.10).
In addition, we analyzed the A′ for H-negative, H-neutral, NH-
negative, NH-neutral conditions, and the results confirmed that
the A′s were not significantly different from the chance level in
each condition (p’s > 0.10). We also performed the ANOVAs
with emotion and context as factors for the A’ analysis. The
results showed that for both semantic tasks, the main effects of
emotion and context, and their interactions were not significant
(F’s > 2, p’s > 0.10). These results confirmed that the subjects
processed the semantic features of pictures without conscious
awareness for different conditions.
Main Effects of Emotion, Category and
Context
We reported the fMRI results for main effects and their
interactions. The interactions between emotion and context,
category and context were not significant in the amygdala
(p’s > 0.05; see Supplementary Tables 1, 2), so only the
interaction of category and emotion, and three-way interactions
were reported in the text.
The bilateral amygdala showed stronger activation for
negative pictures than for neutral pictures (i.e., emotional
effect; left: −22, −1, −9; t(18) = 6.54; p < 0.001; right:
21, −9, −9; t(18) = 3.64; p < 0.005; Figure 3A), which was
consistent with previous findings (for review, see Tsuchiya and
Adolphs, 2007). In addition, there were stronger activations
in the subcortical and cortical regions for negative vs. neutral
pictures, including the right caudate (14, 16, 9; t(18) = 4.03;
p < 0.001), left thalamus (−14, −9, 1; t(18) = 3.53; p < 0.005)
and superior collicus (SC; 11, −24, −9; t(18) = 2.88; p < 0.01;
Figure 3B, Supplementary Table 1). The cortical activation
for emotional effect was located in the posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC), postcentral gyrus and precuneus. Although the
right superior temporal sulcus (STS, 39, −54, 9; t(18) = 3.72;
p< 0.005) showed stronger emotional effect, the cluster size was
relatively small and failed to survive after the rigorous multiple
correction.
There was no significant activation in the amygdala
for the main effect of category, but there were stronger
activations for animals than objects in the brainstem (6, −14,
−29; t(18) = 3.03, p < 0.01; Supplementary Table 1). In
addition, animal pictures elicited stronger activation than
objects in the left anterior prefrontal cortex (PFC), left
superior PFC, medial PFC, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
angular gyrus and temporal gyrus (Figure 4). Note that
animals and objects did not show a strong difference in
cortical animate-inanimate networks (Martin, 2007) except
that the right STS showed animals > objects (46, −56, 30;
t(18) = 2.49; p < 0.05, uncorrected), and the intraparietal lobe
(IPL) showed objects > animals (24, −44, 44; t(18) = 3.31;
p< 0.005).
There was no significant main effect of context in the
amygdala. The contextual effect was shown in the cortical regions
such as the bilateral superior temporal gyrus/sulcus (STG/STS),
cingulate gyrus and postcentral regions (Supplementary Table 1),
which may be involved in evaluating biological threatening
stimuli and relevance detection of social cues (Gross and
Canteras, 2012; Adolphs, 2013; Rushworth et al., 2013).
Interaction Between Category and
Emotion
There was a significant interaction in the left amygdala
between category and emotion (−19, −1, −21; F(1,18) = 12.55;
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FIGURE 3 | Effects of emotion in the amygdala (A) and subcortical regions (B). The color bar represents the contrast of negative vs. neutral (with warm color
as negative > neutral), and represents p-values for t-statistics. The left is on the left side. The number/alphabet combinations shown at the top left corner of each
brain image refer to the y-coordinates in the standard Talaraich atlas (e.g., Figure 2A refers to 2 mm anterior to the AC-PC line).
FIGURE 4 | Cortical activation for category effect. Animal pictures elicited stronger activation than objects in the left anterior prefrontal cortex (PFC), left
superior PFC, mPFC, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), angular gyrus and temporal gyrus, and objects elicited stronger activation than animals in the left intraparietal
lobe (IPL). The color bar represents the contrast of animal vs. object (with warm color as animal > object), and represents p-values for t-statistics. The left is on the
left side. The number/alphabet combinations at the top left corner of each brain image refer to the y-coordinates in the standard Talaraich atlas.
p < 0.005; Figure 5A, left). This interaction was shown as
only negative pictures had stronger activation for animals
than objects in the left amygdala (−26, 1, −9; t(18) = 3.36;
p< 0.005).
Interaction Among Category, Emotion and
Context
There was also a significant interaction of emotion, category
and context in the bilateral amygdala (left: −26, −1, −11;
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FIGURE 5 | The amygdala showed significant interaction between category and emotion, and three-way interaction (A). The amygdala was selected
from the significant three-way interaction, then the beta weights of each subject from the amygdala clusters were extracted and averaged across subjects (B). The
color bar represents p-values for F-statistics of interactions (A). The left is on the left side. The error bars represent the standard errors of the means. The
number/alphabet combinations at the top left corner of each brain image refer to the y-coordinates in the standard Talaraich atlas.
F(1,18) = 10.29; p < 0.01; right: 21, −4, −16; F(1,18) = 6.62;
p < 0.05; Figure 5A, right). The amygdala as regions of
interest (ROIs) were selected from the significant three-way
interaction. Then the beta weights of each subject from the
amygdala clusters were extracted and averaged across the
subjects. Figure 5B shows the signal changes for each category
contrast from the amygdala ROIs. Consistently, the voxel-wise
ANOVA showed that the category effect (animal > object) was
significant for H-negative pictures bilaterally (left: 406 mm3,
−26, −6, −6; t(18) = 3.59; p < 0.005; right: 188 mm3,
24, −4, −9; t(18) = 2.71; p < 0.02); and significant for
NH-negative pictures in the left (126 mm3, −19, −4, −16;
t(18) = 2.72; p < 0.02; Figure 6A). No significant category
effects for neutral conditions were found in the amygdala
(p’s> 0.05).
In the brainstem, the category effect was significant in the
anterior part for NH-pictures and in the posterior part for
H-pictures (Figure 6B). In cortical regions, the left fusiform
gyrus (−34, −42, −9; t(18) = 4.99; p < 0.001) had stronger
activation for H-negative animals (vs. objects). The left middle
temporal gyrus (MTG; −39, −54, −7; t(18) = 5.70; p < 0.001)
and left PFC (−42, 21, 17; t(18) = 5.06; p < 0.001) had stronger
activation for NH-negative objects (vs. animals).
The three-way interaction was also manifested in the
emotional effect, as the bilateral amygdala showed stronger
activation for NH-negative objects vs. NH-neutral objects; (e.g.,
guns vs. hammer; left: −27, 1, −21; t(18) = 3; p < 0.01; right:
28, 19, 1, −21; t(18) = 3.55, p < 0.005), and stronger activation
for H-negative animals vs. H-neutral animals (e.g., snake biting
people vs. ladybug on the hand; left: −29, −4, −9; t(18) = 2.99;
p< 0.01; right: 21,−6,−9; t(18) = 3.52; p< 0.005). When objects
included human context or when animals did not include human
context, negative and neutral pictures led to comparable activity
in the amygdala.
The three-way interaction was also manifested in the context-
related interaction, as the left amygdala showed stronger
activation for H-negative animals than NH-negative ones (−22,
−5,−12; t(18) = 2.67, p< 0.02; e.g., snake biting people vs. snake
alone).
PPI Analysis for Emotional Effect and
Category Effect
To determine the emotional network for unconscious processing,
we performed a PPI analysis to identify regions showing
activation correlated with amygdala activity. A right amygdala
seed region was defined using the coordinates from the
whole brain ANOVA main effect of emotion (21, −9, −9).
The results showed that the activity of the right amygdala
was positively correlated with that of the subcortical regions,
including the caudate (−11, 11, −6; t(18) = 4.68; p < 0.001)
and thalamus (9, −21, 9; t(18) = 3.75; p < 0.005). In
addition, the right amygdala was positively correlated with
the activity in cortical regions of medial PFC, ACC, PCC,
supramarginal cortex, the fusiform gyrus (−47, −45, −24;
t(18) = 4.18; p < 0.001) and occipital regions (Supplementary
Table 3). The results suggest that the subcortical network
for processing negative pictures may be similar to that for
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FIGURE 6 | There were different activation in the amygdala (A) and subcortical regions (B) under each condition. The category effect was shown for
negative pictures especially when the pictures had human contexts. The color bar represents p-values for t-statistics. The left is on the left side. The number/
alphabet combinations at the top left corner of each brain image refer to the y-coordinates in the standard Talaraich atlas.
negative faces (e.g., Morris et al., 1999; Williams et al.,
2006).
To determine the category network (animal vs. object) for
unconscious processing, we performed a second PPI analysis
to identify regions showing activation correlated with amygdala
activity. The right and left amygdala seed regions were defined
using the coordinates from the ANOVA simple effect of category
analysis. There were different correlation patterns between the
amygdala and cortical regions for H-negative pictures and NH-
negative pictures. The left amygdala showed positive correlation
between amygdala and cortical regions of the middle PFC, ACC,
PCC, inferior temporal gyrus and occipital regions for the NH-
negative pictures (Table 2), suggesting that the amygdala has
stronger correlation with these regions for animals (vs. objects).
For the H-negative pictures, the left amygdala had positive
correlation with the anterior PFC, superior PFC and middle
temporal cortex for animals (vs. objects). In contrast to the result
for NH-negative pictures, the left and right amygdala showed
negative correlation with H-negative pictures in the thalamus,
insula, medial prefrontal cortices and STG/STS (Table 3). This
suggests that the amygdala has a stronger correlation with these
regions for H-negative objects than for H-negative animals,
leading to a decreased category effect when human contexts are
involved.
DISCUSSION
The objective of this study was to explore whether different
categories of emotional pictures elicited distinct brain activation
without conscious awareness. By optimally controlling for factors
of valence, arousal and familiarity of pictures across categories,
we found significant interaction of context × category ×
emotion in the amygdala, showing that negative animal pictures
elicited stronger activation in the amygdala than negative
object pictures, especially for those with a human context.
TABLE 2 | PPI results for category effect (animal vs. object in NH-negative
condition).
Animal vs. L/R Region t-value x y z
object
(NH-negative)
Connectivity with left amygdala
Positive
Frontal regions R ACC 4.61 14 34 −1
L Cingulate cortex 4.09 −11 9 29
R Middle frontal gyrus 4.13 34 36 −4
L Medial frontal gyrus 4.19 −6 21 46
L Medial frontal gyrus 4.29 −11 −6 51
R Medial frontal gyrus 4.41 11 41 16
L Medial frontal gyrus 4.05 −11 59 11
R Superior frontal gyrus 2.83 14 49 29
L Insula 5.24 −34 21 −1
L Insula 3.41 −34 −14 21
Parietal and midline L PCC/parietal cortex 4.63 −14 −51 16
R PCC 4.31 14 −49 41
R PCC 3.59 11 −51 6
R Paracentral gyrus 3.18 4 −31 44
Temporal regions R Inferior temporal gyrus 4.78 −56 −59 −6
R Inferior temporal gyrus 4.48 64 −21 −6
R STG 4.49 54 −24 6
R Fusiform gyrus 4.24 36 −57 −16
Occipital regions L Cuneus 3.54 −16 −76 6
R Lingual gyrus 4.00 21 −91 −1
R Lingual gyrus 3.31 1 −74 −4
Subcortical regions L Hippocampus 6.71 −26 −24 −4
Negative (not any)
Animals and objects elicited limited activity in cortical animate-
inanimate networks during unconscious processing. There were
different correlation patterns between the amygdala and cortical
regions for H-negative and NH-negative pictures. These results
suggest that human context, emotional feature and stimulus
category interact when pictures are processed without conscious
awareness.
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TABLE 3 | PPI results for category effect (animal vs. object in H-negative
condition).
Animal vs. L/R Region t-value x y z
object
(H-negative)
Connectivity with left amygdala
Positive
Frontal regions R Anterior prefrontal 4.40 49 29 −6
cortex
L Superior frontal 3.15 −6 51 36
cortex
Temporal regions R Inferior temporal 4.05 66 −11 −19
gyrus
L Superior temporal 4.61 −54 −39 −1
gyrus
Negative
Frontal regions R Medial frontal −5.87 11 −21 59
gyrus
L Insula −4.76 −31 −6 6
L Insula −4.87 −39 1 16
R Insula −4.10 41 16 16
Temporal regions R STG −3.47 54 −41 14
Subcortical regions L Thalamus −5.11 −6 −16 9
R Thalamus −4.31 6 −19 9
Connectivity with right amygdala
Positive (not any)
Negative
Frontal regions R ACC −5.21 6 14 31
L Cingulate −4.33 −11 9 31
cortex
L Inferior frontal −3.21 −44 29 6
gyrus
L Superior frontal −3.54 −31 26 49
gyrus
L Insula −6.54 −31 −16 14
L Postcentral −3.67 −51 −21 26
cortex
L Precentral −4.41 −34 −14 59
cortex
L Precentral −3.94 −44 −6 46
cortex
Parietal regions R Supramarginal −3.73 59 −46 34
gyrus
L Inferior parietal −3.36 −36 −44 54
cortex
Temporal regions R STG −5.16 59 −29 11
L STG −4.81 −59 −24 11
L STG −4.22 −54 −44 9
Occipital regions R Lingual gyrus −3.87 24 −51 1
Subcortical regions R Thalamus −4.41 6 −19 6
L Thalamus −5.41 −11 −11 −9
Category Effect in the Amygdala and
Subcortical Regions
The novel finding of our study was that the activity in the
amygdala and subcortical regions showed significant three-way
interaction among emotion, category and context. Specifically,
enhanced activation for negative animals (vs. objects) occurred
in the amygdala, especially for those with human context. This
indicated that, when the stimuli are processed without conscious
awareness, not only do negative pictures have an advantage in
being processed, but also the negative animal pictures are more
strongly processed, especially when the context contains human
information.
The amygdala is part of an early vigilance system, detecting
biologically relevant stimuli for further prioritized processing
(Whalen, 1998; Davis and Whalen, 2001; Lipka et al., 2011).
Under the assumption of the preparedness theory, negative
stimuli in animal categories are processed unconsciously in
the amygdala due to evolutionary pressure (Ohman and
Mineka, 2001), but most studies only compared negative
vs. neutral stimuli without taking the stimulus category as
a factor. Our study provided direct neural evidence that,
among the negative pictures, the animals was more processed
in the amygdala than objects; probably due to the fact
animals are potential predators for humans (Ohman and
Mineka, 2001). Thus, the amygdala may help the perceptual
system extract animal-related negative emotion information
from an observed scene. It is of note that, only negative
stimuli (but not neutral) showed significant activation in
the amygdala, suggesting that the amygdala activation is
not associated with general vigilance during unconscious
processing, but rather preferentially involved in processing
threatening conditions that are most relevant to human
survival.
We also clarified that human context modulated the category
effect in the amygdala. Previous studies have shown that
human-related information may be unconsciously processed
(Frith and Frith, 2008; Adolphs, 2010). Our study further
demonstrated that, when human information was included in
the context, the amygdala activation was stronger than when
human context was not included, probably because of the
more threatening nature of the human context. In contrast,
the category effect in skin conductance appeared for pictures
regardless of the human context involved (Tan et al., 2013).
The difference between the fMRI activity and skin conductance
results may have resulted from the fact that they reflect
different aspects of emotional reactions. The amygdala activity
reflects autonomic vigilance and preparation system especially
for threatening animals with human contexts, and the SCR
reflects action preparation for quick defensive response, which
is not sensitive to contextual information without conscious
awareness.
In addition to the amygdala, we found significant activation
in subcortical regions, such as the PAG/LC and midbrain,
in representing the category effect, which are known to be
responsive not only to emotional faces (e.g., Williams et al.,
2006), but also to other contents of emotional stimuli such
as body gestures (de Gelder, 2006) and fearful animals (e.g.,
Carlsson et al., 2004; Alpers et al., 2009). As these stimuli belong
to a category of biological stimuli, the amygdala coordinates with
other subcortical regions in evaluating the biological significance
of affective stimuli.
Context-Modulated Connectivity Between
the Amygdala and Cortical Regions
Context-dependent fear may have different neural mechanisms
compared to context-independent fear, with more involvement
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or a different coupling pattern of the mPFC, ACC and
other cortical regions (Gross and Canteras, 2012; Adolphs,
2013). The connectivity analysis elucidated that there were
different correlation patterns for animal vs. object between
the amygdala and cortical regions under the H-negative and
NH-negative conditions. Positive correlation for NH-negative
pictures revealed that the amygdala increased the response
to animals relative to objects in these regions, leading to
increased category effect (animal > object). The negative
correlation for H-negative pictures, on the other hand, revealed
that the amygdala connectivity with cortical and subcortical
regions increased for objects (vs. animals), leading to reduced
category effect. These regions included the aPFC, inferior PFC,
ACC and insula, and they are related to responses to fear
(e.g., increased attention for saliency; Williams et al., 2006;
Carlson et al., 2012), affective autonomic feedback during
emotional arousal (Carlson et al., 2012), modulatory control
and regulation to emotional processing (Adolphs, 2013). This
suggests that when negative objects with human contexts (e.g.,
gun held by a man) are presented, a top-down modulation
from cortical regions would increase to prepare for quick
responses. That is, the fear of evolutionary-related animals
is automatic and prepared, whereas the fear of recently
emerged objects may depend on their contexts (Ohman and
Mineka, 2001; Blanchette, 2006; Yang et al., 2012a) and cortical
interactions.
Category Representation in Cortical
Regions Without Conscious Awareness
In the first study that showed category effect for unconscious
processing, we only found partial evidence for the category-
specific activations. Among these previously revealed networks
(Martin, 2007), we found that the right STS and left parietal
cortex were differentially activated by the main effect of category.
Semantic information is processed prior to emotion information
during unconscious processing, because semantic categorization
is faster and more accurate than affective processing even with
short exposures (e.g., Nummenmaa et al., 2010). Nevertheless,
semantic processing is not the same as processing under
conscious conditions because stimuli are more coarsely and
roughly processed. The subcortical pathway quickly processes
coarse information of animate features, which may account for
our behavioral findings, although detailed semantic information
is not accessible for unconscious processing (Kang et al., 2011).
On the other hand, our study showed that the dorsal parts
of the network, such as the STS and parietal cortex, were
activated even without conscious awareness. It suggests that
category representation in the dorsal pathway might not fully
rely on conscious awareness. Previous studies have shown that
the dorsal visual pathways may process information without
conscious awareness (Goodale and Milner, 1992; Fang and He,
2005; Almeida et al., 2008; Suzuki et al., 2014; for review, Mahon
and Caramazza, 2011; Milner, 2012). The suppressed stimuli may
activate subcortical regions including the amygdala, and through
direct projection from SC to posterior parietal cortex, activate
dorsal regions (Almeida et al., 2008).
Unconscious Processing of Category
Information
The procedure and post hoc assessment ensured that participants
processed the pictures unconsciously. For example, the
sandwich-masking paradigm, in which the masks appeared
before and after the target picture for an optimal masking
effect, robustly reduced perceptual awareness (Harris et al.,
2011). The results of the semantic tasks for assessing the level of
awareness indicated that subjects processed the pictures without
consciously identifying animals or objects.
The reasons that we chose the semantic judgment tasks
were the following: (1) To achieve the main objective of
the study, it was necessary to ensure that subjects processed
the category/semantic information unconsciously. (2) The size
judgment was also a type of semantic task because subjects had
to make a decision based on the actual size of the stimulus
(e.g., Dobbins et al., 2004; Kensinger and Schacter, 2008). Thus,
even though they perceived a few perceptual features (e.g., color)
and made inference in the animal/object judgment, they could
not use the same information to make the size judgment (Tan
et al., 2013). (3) Previous studies suggest that semantic judgment
occurs earlier than emotional judgment due to the involvement
of semantic categorization in affective analysis (Storbeck et al.,
2006; Storbeck and Clore, 2007; Nummenmaa et al., 2010).
If subjects were at chance to make categorization, it would
be reasonable to assume that they were unaware of emotional
attributes. Our previous behavioral studies showed that both
semantic and emotional judgments were at chance when the
same procedure was applied (Tan et al., 2013).
The category effect in our study may reflect the difference
in semantic or conceptual representation between categories,
rather than the differences in perceptual and other features for
the following reasons. First, we obtained the category effect
when the affective levels and familiarity levels were optimally
matched across categories. There was no statistically significant
difference between animals and objects in each condition
(i.e., H-negative, NH-negative, H-neutral, NH-neutral) for both
valence and arousal ratings. In addition, including more than
one typical animal (e.g., snake, gun) enabled us to clarify
to what extent animals differed from object in category level
rather than individual concept level (e.g., snake). Second, low-
level perceptual features, picture size, position of focal object
and context and contextual information were matched across
categories. In addition, previous studies suggest that category
distinctions might be more dominant than perceptual features
under unconscious conditions (e.g., Sebastiani et al., 2011;
Codispoti et al., 2012). For instance, phobic patients only showed
increased SCR for spiders (but not for crab and squirrel)
when stimuli were unconsciously presented (Sebastiani et al.,
2011). Third, affective analysis requires semantic categorization
(Storbeck et al., 2006; Storbeck and Clore, 2007; Nummenmaa
et al., 2010), which may precede affective evaluation of visual
scenes. When the participants were presented with a scene for
40 ms, they extracted enough semantic information (Castelhano
and Henderson, 2008). Consistently, the attention bias to the
animal targets occured during the first fixation (Yang et al.,
2012b). Combining with these findings, our results suggest that
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the amygdala and subcortical regions are important in detecting
negative animal (but not objects) pictures so that humans are
quickly prepared for potential dangers even without conscious
awareness.
Limitation
There are several potential limitations of the current study.
First, emotional and contextual information should be rated to
ensure that subjects were unaware of whether the picture was
negative/neutral and whether it included human/human parts.
Second, we did not included a ‘‘conscious’’ condition in the
experimental design, which limits the possibility to draw any
direct comparison between observed activation in this study with
those that under a conscious condition. Third, our study showed
that the amygdala was responsive to emotional, categorical and
contextual features of pictures during unconscious processing.
However, due to the temporal and spatial limitations of fMRI
(Adolphs, 2010), we could not provide functional specialization
with the amygdala from the current study. Fourth, although
we explored category difference by controlling emotional and
lower level differences, there are other ways to eliminate the
potential confounding factors. For example, it is interesting to
use identical pictures with only background replaced to explore
the contextual effect, and to differentiate typical and atypical
concepts to explore category effect under both conscious and
unconscious conditions.
CONCLUSION
When the valence and arousal levels were optimally controlled,
the amygdala and subcortical regions showed stronger activation
for animals than for objects, and this advantage was most
prominent when the human context was involved. Furthermore,
contextual information influenced their activities through top-
down modulation, indicating that threatening stimuli that are
most relevant to human survival are preferentially processed.
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